



Scene from act 3 of Karel Čapek's play *R.U.R.* (*Rossum's Universal Robots*), produced by Theatre Guild, London, 1923

If Futurity Is the Philosophy of Science Fiction, Alterity Is Its Anthropology: On Colonial Power and Science Fiction

I want to see science fiction that goes against both apocalyptic dystopias and political utopias. I want to see SF that is rooted in the present, anthropologically aware, and open to the multiplicity of non-Western futures. Perhaps a first step would be to look at SF not as a literary genre, but as a system, a sociopolitical modality, a worldmaking technique, found as much in past colonial forms as right now in the present. This also means that one would have to dare go beyond the use of SF as a lens to look at colonial forms past and present and instead, or alongside it, consider colonialism itself as SF. Despite anthropology's recent interest in SF, most of its approaches cling to, let's say, a traditional view of SF as either a tool (a lens) to look at culture or as a product of culture.¹ Instead, what I am suggesting is to see certain social formations, as well as forms and techniques of power, as SF itself. Doing so may demand anthropological entanglements and experiments with SF that ask not what it can tell us about colonial modes of power, but allow analysis to be permeated by SF itself. For example, it is common knowledge that SF offers a vision of colonialism (by expressing it either openly or subliminally in its stories), but if one refracts SF back on colonial modes of power it is perhaps those colonial structures themselves that will begin to appear to us as modalities of SF. If so, then my basic premise is this: anywhere there is a clash between the biopolitical management (of life and death) and the suppression of other possible worlds that escape desired narratives of power, there will be the question of science fiction. And here, perhaps unsurprisingly, the management of the future, or futures to be more exact, will be key.

*Space and Science Fiction:
Sameness and Difference in
Global Space*

“Science fiction exposes something that colonialism imposes,” writes literary critic John Rieder.²

Differentiating SF from early modern utopias, Rieder has traced its emergence to changes in the perception of space and time within the nineteenth-century British empire. In doing so, he emphasizes the relationship, both thematic and historic, between SF and colonialism: a relation that has often defined the genre as a lens to look at colonial power. This relationship has taken many forms: from classical SF to recent postcolonial SF (often, though not always, written from the position of non-Euro-American modernities) and Afro- and Indigenous futurisms (which subvert the future-oriented canon of hard SF by rooting its speculation either in diasporic realities or pre- and altermodern technologies).³ But while postcolonial and Afro- or Indigenous futurisms present themselves as counternarratives to colonial power, classical SF can be regarded as emerging from aspirations and fears of a globalized world.⁴

The early colonization of Africa and the Americas (and later the Pacific) required a spatial organization of both peoples and natures, through which both universal science and global capital could flow. In fact, in her book on the production and dissemination of universal ideas, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*, anthropologist Anna Tsing looks at the “globe” itself as a particular universalized idea, with very specific regional origins (modern Europe). Despite being anthropologically located, this globalization was imposed on different natures and cultures across the world.⁵ As everyone knows, the Western European white man was at its center. However, this white man faced a problem: across the globe’s remotest deserts, islands, and forests, Europeans found other humans to be all in all like themselves. For globalization to be successful these “others” had to be imagined and produced (through science) as different. Thus, along with the globe, a new humanity had to be invented as well, so as to justify the occupation of those lands—making the modern construct of “humanity” the fuzzy threshold, the colonial “science fiction,” through which difference came to be judged.⁶

The nineteenth-century canonization of history as a discipline, along with ethnology and evolutionary theory, increasingly framed the above spatial organization of the globe as temporal. The coeval coexistence of humans expressed not only different humanities but more precisely different *stages* of humanity. This is the political meaning of “the contemporary,” majestically grasped by Johannes Fabian in his *Time and*

the Other.⁷ One can trace the shift from the word “savage” to “primitive” in Western thought to this historical change—for in the eyes of sixteenth-century Jesuits, Amerindians might be uncultured, yes, but they were not necessarily old, that is, primitive—quite the opposite: they were like “children” begging to be civilized.⁸

Similarly, according to Rieder, classical SF literature from the mid-nineteenth century up to World War I—from Samuel Butler and Jules Verne to H. G. Wells and H. P. Lovecraft—fantasized this difference, mapping and positioning otherness (other, non-white, “nonmodern” people) in relation to the future-oriented, industrial, and technoscientific modern world. Structured by the distinction between primitive and modern, wild and civilized, classical SF oriented its stories toward the future, embodying, despite its concern for ethnographic diversity, a teleological concept of time. This is why ideas of futurity are as important as ideas of alterity for SF. If futurity is the philosophy of science fiction, alterity is its anthropology.

Writing Science Fiction from the “Other” Side

Like humans, nature was also adapted to modernity. While modern science was rapidly disenchanting nature, early SF abounded in Victorian fables about men rediscovering “lost worlds” and closed-off societies in remote geographies (the bottom of the sea, the center of the earth, the jungle). Interestingly, it was not only the human cultures found in such spaces that were either more or less advanced than that of modernity, but also the natures therein—either wild with dinosaurs or absolutely engineered.

Samuel Butler’s *Erewhon* (1872) is about another lost world, interesting for its open dialoguing with Charles Darwin’s evolutionary biology. *Erewhon* is an isolated society that, foreseeing the threat posed by the evolution of machines, decides to freeze technological progress and relegate machines to museums, therefore reverting the linearity of modern technocapitalist time. In it, the technological evolution of machines is compared to the biological adaptation of animals to their environments, and it is us humans who realize how we will soon be reduced to beasts of burden if machines are allowed to thrive. In his analysis of *Erewhon*, theorist of “black technopoetics” Louis Chude-Sokei stresses how, curiously enough, these industrious machines pose a threat to humans because they will see us as lazy (a preconception about peoples of the Global South), thus binding us to servitude (by which such lazy people are put to labor).⁹ Butler’s fear of machines is yet again the fear of becoming “other.”

Chude-Sokei also narrates how Darwin was surprised that *Erewhon* was written in the colonies—Butler was then living in New Zealand. Why was Darwin surprised? Because he judged colonial space as a place without time for speculation, only for the pursuit of material interests, that is, survival.¹⁰ Quite the opposite: it was precisely because the colonies were spaces of material interest, of extraction, terraformation, and social change in the service of productivity that they were also spaces of imagination, of speculation, of futurity. The future, like modernity, started in the colonies.

When talking about colonialism, SF forces us to look at the entwinement or intimacy between people and land, between human labor and putting the land to work. It is of this mutuality that I am thinking when I refer to colonialism. As I hope to show, biopolitics is always already ecopolitics.

The Biopolitics of Science Fiction: Flesh, Not Wires

No matter how “hard” the science fiction, the origins of robots will forever remain wet. For in Karel Čapek’s 1921 play *R.U.R.* (*Rossum’s Universal Robots*), which first introduced the word “robot” to the public, robots are made of flesh and blood: wetware, not hardware. Chude-Sokei summarizes, “They behave like living matter but are not living matter and so it is easy for old Rossum to synthesize them and build bodies for them. Rossum’s robots are biological machines, though produced far in advance of the notion of genetic engineering.”¹¹

The origins of SF’s robotics are thus a curious and prescient moment, when the relation between robots and slaves, race and aliens, is not yet metaphorical or mere analogy. While *R.U.R.* remains concerned with the question of the soul—what I call the “android loop” plaguing all robot-related stories ever since Descartes’s automaton daughter and his mechanical animals—its robots are metabolic, gene-carrying beings of flesh and blood.¹² It is this that makes the violence of its war between robots and humans all the more palpable, and makes meaningful their obsession with reproduction, not mechanical or algorithmic, but biological.

In this too *R.U.R.* is influential, for not only did it introduce the robot, it also introduced the robot insurrection trope. In this respect, *R.U.R.*’s robots are closer to Afrofuturism’s claim that plantation slavery was already science fiction lived daily than to Isaac Asimov’s hardware robots, imbued with positronic brains (a CPU mimicking human consciousness) and the three laws of robotics (stopping robots from harming

humans). A key colonial word—reproduction, or the control of reproduction—is thus at the origins of robotics. And this anguish over the possibility or impossibility of reproduction is what raises the question: whose future?

Pedro Neves
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On Colonial
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The Biopolitics of Science Fiction: The Plantation

Afrofuturism is right. The plantation, and, later on, the factory, was a clear example of the relation between SF and colonial systems. The plantation was a managerial, bio- and ecopolitical place where both space and time were made modern. It installed and fomented a particularly modern futurity; it instilled modernity itself.¹³

The plantation was a space where the life of certain bodies was judged more valuable than others, and thus where the potentiation or the suppression of possible futures was decided. Such sovereignty suppressed futures that escaped its desired narratives of power—futures otherwise possible. Historically, by controlling physical bodies inscribed in nonmodern cosmologies, the colonial plantation narrowed the possibilities of that which could come to be. It not only erased the pasts of enslaved people but also the diversity of other contesting futures embodied in them. The control of the future is key to colonialism—not only the management of the present but also the narrowing of the future to a single world.

What I mean, and this is key to my argument, is that the colonial rupture is not simply one of erasure. It subjugates other possible futures to a more productive one. In the plantation, as in the mine and the factory, economic productivity and growth were means of suppressing other futures. By redesigning the present from the standpoint of future capital accumulation, the plantation contributed to the production of a new, more productive present. This capitalist future oriented the present, exchanging a diversity of anthropological worlds, of different natures and cultures, for ever greater acceleration, ever greater fluidity and exchange. It meant the acceleration of a single modern world.¹⁴ Recalling Tsing's words, the plantation placed one world in opposition to many worlds, and in doing so, helped to unify the globe.

While, arguably, slave labor might not be structurally capitalist, in that it does not involve waged labor, it is germinally capitalist; that is, what it predicts is the arrival of capital. The slave is always already a value-generating, cost-reducing, and fully tradable commodity—both a premonition and a condition of capitalism. Fortunately, however, the argument could and should be reversed: while slave struggles might not be

anti-capitalist, there would be no class struggle without emancipatory struggles by plantation workers against colonial slavery. This, at least, is an anti-capitalist future the plantation could not suppress.

The Future Anterior: When the Past Arrives from the Future

I should clarify what I mean by futurity, as well as the future as a political space. Kodwo Eshun, artist and theorist of Afrofuturism, defines SF as “a significant distortion of the present.” Building on Samuel Delany and William Gibson, he adds, “To be more precise, science fiction is neither forward-looking nor utopian.”¹⁵ This would seem to dismantle the notion that the future is a core element of SF, bringing Eshun’s definition closer to that of SF critic Darko Suvin, who defined the “formal framework” of SF as “cognitive estrangement.” By cognitive estrangement, Suvin means a perceptive shift better exemplified by Bertolt Brecht’s words: “A representation which estranges is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar.”¹⁶

But then Eshun continues: “Science fiction is a means through which to preprogram the present. Looking back at the genre, it becomes apparent that science fiction was never concerned with the future, but rather with engineering feedback between its *preferred* future and its *becoming* present.”¹⁷

Eshun is not denying SF’s future-oriented nature as such. But rather than simply emphasizing the present imagination of the future, he focuses on how the production of future horizons comes to shape the present. To him this is where the politics of futurity lie—contrary to common expectations, it is not the future that emerges from the present, but rather the present (and the past) that “arrive from the future.” This is, of course, a cybernetic approach. For at the core of this reversal is a notion of predictive power—managing the present in such a way that the future is predetermined in advance.

Writing from the intersection of anthropology and the history of genetics, Michael Fortun has identified this reversal in the sciences, and has called it “future anterior.” Fortun defines the future anterior as a techno-scientific future that by its very utterance becomes self-determined, orienting the present toward itself and rereading the past in its image.¹⁸ More spectacularly, he adds, this is a future that does not even need a past.¹⁹ Operating at the level of the imaginary, of fictional narratives, the future anterior posits the dominance of a universal that does not yet exist. This is what is meant when one hears claims like: the twenty-first century will

be the century of genetics. It does not matter the present state of genetics; what matters is its promise.

According to Eshun, prediction is not necessarily the role of Afrofuturisms (or, one could add, of Indigenous futurisms), and so their use of futurity is in tension with the technological determinism of the future anterior. What Afrofuturism does is rewire the future anterior so as to intervene “within the dimensions of the predictive.”²⁰ This means envisioning livelihoods beyond the determinism of Western technoscience, but also, as importantly, beyond the dystopia and survivalism to which black, Native, and othered times and spaces in general have been predeterminedly tied. The latter is of special importance: one cannot dwell on dystopia. It would be the same as, faced with the disruptions of climate change, reducing ecology to resilience.

The Afrofuturist idea that “black existence and science fiction are one and the same” is likely the biggest revolution to have occurred in SF since the transition from white colonial sublimation (as discussed by Rieder) to white space utopia (exemplified by hard SF), and then, from the 1960s onward, from hard SF to the sociological, feminist, and queer approaches of the New Wave.²¹ For what it did was drop SF into the “real” world—repositioning it from an allegory of violence to the corruption of reality. Such SF futurisms take off where those othered futures were cut off.

The Biopolitics of Science Fiction: Diversity

With the future anterior in mind, let’s go back to the plantation. The future-oriented quality of the plantation cannot be conceptualized without diversity control: control over the future not only of culture but also of nature.

The variety of maize still present across the Andes, for example, is a lived, resistant memory of the reduction of diversity to monoculture. Here again Tsing’s use of “globe” is revealing. She writes, “Botany was perhaps the first science concerned with uniting knowledge from around the globe to create a singular global knowledge. [...] Nature and the globe have helped make each other. Today’s most powerful claims about the nature of the globe refer us to *global Nature*.”²² For Tsing, globalization does not coincide with a worldly perspective; it is not anthropological enough. For her, monocultural plantations epitomize the universalizing claims of this global Nature. As simplifications of life, plantations cut across any geographic constraints, any origin histories, any nativity concepts.

The nature of bodies and the nature of the land are always inseparable. What is done to one is implicated in the other. This much is true all across the ecological chain, from insects and their threatened niches to humans and their workplaces. The suppression of futures in the plantations relates humans to landscape; in fact, suppression would be impossible without tying or untying the two. For the control of diversity in the plantation ruptures not only Native social ties, but also cosmological relations between humans and nonhumans, be it plants, animals, or even spirits.

Two quotes come to my mind. In his introduction to Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*, Jean-Paul Sartre writes, "The only way the European could make himself *man* was by fabricating slaves and monsters."²³ Man (and I mean man, not human) is always a difference. That is to say, not the normal but the abnormal constitutes his identity. Man is the aberration that extracts himself from the world of others.

Against this, there is Claude Lévi-Strauss on the foundation of Native American myths, who writes that myth is "the time when humans and animals did not yet distinguish themselves from one another."²⁴

Talking about myth, especially because I am talking about time, futurity, and the productivity of capital, it would be easy to say that what occurs in the plantation is the substitution of a mythic temporality with the messianic time of modernity—in other words, a shift from cyclical time to linear time. I am not so sure about this. For the difference between the human and its "others" is precisely what is managed by the boom and bust cycles of capital as inscribed in the process of globalization. For it is in moments of crisis and renewal of capital, that is, of creative destruction, that who is and is not human is repeatedly redefined.²⁵ The future of modern time is always the imagined excision of the human from the animal, even when animals are other people.

Beyond the Uncanny Valley: Racism among Robots

Throughout his book *The Sound of Culture*, Chude-Sokei focuses on the racialization of robots and androids, in particular their sublimation of slave labor and the role of race in the invention of humanity—poignantly *R.U.R.*'s robots date from "1932, precisely four hundred forty years after the discovery of America."²⁶ Yet again, *R.U.R.* is indeed a good example, for when confronted with the uprising of robots, what is the (hu)manly strategy used to control them? The strategy is to seed racism in their midst:

Each factory will be making Robots of a different color, a different nationality, a different tongue; they'll all be different—as different from one another as fingerprints; they'll no longer be able to conspire with one another; and we—we people will help to foster their prejudices and cultivate their mutual lack of understanding, you see? So that any given Robot, to the day of its death, right to the grave, will forever hate a Robot bearing the trademark of another factory.²⁷

Robots will be forged on neither an anthropomorphic image nor an image of the human soul, but on the image of human sociology.²⁸ It is thus that at the end of *R.U.R.*, after having killed every single human, a victorious robot suddenly confronts his future with terror, for it cannot reproduce itself and is thus also destined to die. That first and last robot cries: “You gave us weapons. We had to become masters. [...] You have to conquer and murder if you want to be people!”²⁹

The uncanny valley, that eerie feeling one gets when faced with an overly humanlike robot, is a farce. It is not the feeling that matters but rather the division it instills between the observer and the observed. The uncanny valley, when pushed to its logical conclusion, is the beginning of segregation.

The sad lesson of *R.U.R.* is that the only way for robots to become human is by emulating division: that is, by internalizing an image of power. Going back to the example of the plantation, it is clear how it imposed segregation not only between slave and master, but just as importantly among peoples otherwise in solidarity, that is, in the potential connectivity between possible futures—futures that may come to contest the master.³⁰

Future Futures

My introduction to this text could be reframed thus: if, as Eshun suggests, SF is not about the future, why then am I calling the future back to SF? In other words, why bother to save the future? Tentatively, I answer: Because to keep the future in science fiction might mean saving the future from itself. The future matters; it may just not be found where one expects it.

A good starting point might be to look for the future sideways, horizontally rather than ahead. Or to break with geometry, to look for futures already intertwined, enmeshed since the birth of modernity, simultaneously symbiotic and in disagreement with preexisting power relations. If alterity is the anthropology of SF, then demanding answers from the

future means finding one's future always already overlapping with someone else's. I'll therefore venture that the "formal framework" of science fiction is the encounter with radical difference: it is the form, the testimony, and the imagination of the struggle and the conflict between differing natures and cultures, different worldviews and cosmovisions.

How do Indigenous cosmologies, myths, and livelihoods answer back to science fiction? This is a horizontal question.

In recent years, the struggle between a single world and the many worlds has become central to political (or cosmopolitical, to be more precise) anthropology.³¹ This conflict between the narrative of a single world and the suppressed reality of many worlds is, of course, the dismantling of colonial structures, as they linger in the present. What I timidly propose with this text is simply to include the issue of futurity in this discussion—to think the many futures, how they survived the violence of their times and are now restarting to assert and invent themselves anew.

The danger here, of course, is that of imposing ontological divisions on the cosmologies of others—for example, using Western ideas and technology to help the struggles of others. Take for example the Aymara Indigenous people of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, who, between language and bodily perception, conceptualize the future otherwise. For the Aymara the future is not coming toward us, to meet us from the front; the future is the unseen on one's back. Makes sense: if one's past belongs to the realm of the visible, of the known, of that which has already been experienced, why not see it in front of us? Inversely, why not place the future in the shadows, away from visibility, approaching us from over the shoulder, from the periphery? Look over your shoulder, dear reader.

- 1 See Ryan Anderson et al., eds., "Speculative Anthropologies" series, *Theorizing the Contemporary*, *Cultural Anthropology*, December 18, 2018, <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1627-speculative-anthropologies>.
- 2 John Rieder, *Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2008), 15.
- 3 Since the 1950s "hard" has been the common term for scientifically based, usually future-oriented science fiction, used in contrast to the term "soft"—as in hard and soft (social) sciences. Arthur C. Clarke, for example, is a hard SF icon.
- 4 For Indigenous futurisms see Grace L. Dillon, ed., *Walking the Clouds: An Anthology of Indigenous Science Fiction* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012). See also Rebecca Roanhorse, "Postcards from the Apocalypse," *Uncanny*, no. 20 (January/February 2018), <https://uncannymagazine.com/article/postcards-from-the-apocalypse/>.
- 5 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 76.
- 6 Focusing on the shifting shapes of the concept of humanity, always anthropologically localized, I have tentatively thought of this modernist construct of humanity as a

- humanist capitalism*, referring to the interwoven invention of mercantile capitalism and philosophical humanism within modernity. See Pedro Neves Marques, "How Many Natures Can Nature Nurture? The Human, Multinaturalism and Variation," in *Elemental Propositions*, ed. Ashkan Sepahvand et al. (Beirut: Sursock Art Museum, 2016), 20–25.
- 7 Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
 - 8 This is a critique long established in contemporary anthropology, in its attempt at integrating self-decolonization, postcolonial studies, and feminist history of science. Besides Fabian, in anthropology the work of H el ene Clastres is of note. In postcolonial studies, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). In the feminist history of science, see Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980).
 - 9 Louis Chude-Sokei, *The Sound of Culture: Diaspora and Black Technopoetics* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2016), 103–104.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 113.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, 60.
 - 12 On Descartes's mechanical doll, see Gaby Wood, *Edison's Eve: A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life* (New York: Random House, 2002); excerpt available at Gaby Wood, "Edison's Eve," *New York Times*, August 25, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/books/chapters/edisons-eve.html>.
 - 13 I am writing these sentences in the past tense, but I might as well write them in the present, when thinking about the war waged against Indigenous and other local populations living near monoculture plantations today, as, for example, in Brazil.
 - 14 For an anthropological contextualization of this argument (the clash between the one world of modernity and the many other worlds henceforth made invisible), see Marisol de la Cadena, "Uncommoning Nature," in "Apocalypsis," ed. Pedro Neves Marques, in "Supercommunity," special issue, *e-flux journal*, no. 65 (August 2015), <http://supercommunity.e-flux.com/texts/uncommoning-nature/>.
 - 15 Kodwo Eshun, "Further Considerations on Afrofuturism," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 2 (2003): 290.
 - 16 Bertolt Brecht, "Short Organon for the Theatre," in *Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic*, trans. and ed. John Willett (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964), 192, quoted in Darko Suvin, "Estrangement and Cognition," *Strange Horizons*, November 24, 2014, <http://strangehorizons.com/non-fiction/articles/estrangement-and-cognition/>.
 - 17 Eshun, "Further Considerations on Afrofuturism," 290 (my emphasis).
 - 18 Michael A. Fortun, "The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future Anterior," in *Science, History, and Social Activism: A Tribute to Everett Mendelsohn*, ed. Garland E. Allen and Roy M. MacLeod (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 332–369.
 - 19 Fortun, "The discourse of gene action has allowed geneticists to leverage a future without a full guarantee from a grounding past." *Ibid.*, 358.
 - 20 Eshun, "Further Considerations on Afrofuturism," 293.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, 298.
 - 22 Tsing, *Friction*, 90 (my emphasis).
 - 23 I was reminded of this when reading Chude-Sokei. See Jean-Paul Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), LIX.
 - 24 Claude L evi-Strauss, interview by Didier Eribon, *Conversations with Claude L evi-Strauss*, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), quoted in Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, "Perspectivism and Multinaturalism in Indigenous America," in *The Forest and the School / Where to Sit at the Dinner Table?*, ed. Pedro Neves Marques (Berlin: Archive Books, 2015), 321.

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- 25 See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); and Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1994).
- 26 Karel Čapek, *R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots)*, trans. Claudia Novack-Jones (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 6.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 45.
- 28 This “making the enemy in one’s own image” was also my critique of Sophia, a robot developed by Hanson Robotics in 2015, which was granted Saudi Arabian citizenship at the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh in 2017. See Pedro Neves Marques, “Sophia, with Love and Hate,” *Baffler*, November 14, 2017, <https://thebaffler.com/latest/sophia-with-love-and-hate-marques>.
- 29 Čapek, *R.U.R.*, 74.
- 30 For example, between black and Indigenous peoples; see Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2015), 91; Brett Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slavery in New France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); and Margaret Ellen Newell, *Brethren by Nature: New England Indians, Colonists, and the Origins of American Slavery* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). For a short introduction, see Rebecca Onion, “Native American Slaves: Historians Uncover an Overlooked, Chilling Chapter in U.S. History,” *Slate*, January 18, 2006, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2016/01/native_american_slavery_historians_uncover_a_chilling_chapter_in_u_s_history.html.
- 31 See Marisol de la Cadena and Mario Blaser, eds., *A World of Many Worlds* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018).