Mimetic Traps: Forests, Images, Worlds

by Pedro Neves Marques, 2017.

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> *There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds. All these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability, but of elaborate specificity and difference and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another's point of view, even when the other is our own machine.*
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> — Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," 1991.

The Nature of Images

By examining the ambiguity of images in-between different *natureculture*s, a term borrowed from Donna Haraway, I want to think about the encounters and discrepancies between different techno-visual ontologies by way of the natureculture of images in the Amerindian Amazon forest. (1) I will do so by looking at the words of Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa through the lens of Amerindian multinaturalism, along with their detailed analysis by anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, in his essay titled, "The Crystal Forest: Notes on the Ontology of Amazonian Spirits," as well as anthropologist Michael Taussig's notion of mimesis.

What seems to be clear from an Amazonian, Amerindian point of view on the forest, is that there cannot be one forest, or an image of the forest, when forests are but a crystal of many images. This serves to say that there is a discrepancy between the way Amerindian people living in the Amazon read images in and of the forest and the way technoscientific image-recording devices access it—which does not deny them collaborations and entanglements. This is because technologies, on both onto-cosmological sides, do not exist in a vacuum. Technologies carry with them worlds; they are ontological embodiments.

The issue of cosmopolitical encounters and translations is a hard and complex one, occupying the politics of contemporary anthropology. Its matter has been not only how to understand other worlds but also how to work by acknowledging their irreducibility. For example, the fact that Amerindians in the region might say not that they see the forest differently, which would be a (multi)culturalist approach, but that the nature of the forest is itself different (a multinaturalist approach). However, the irreducibility of worlds, their non-equivalence, might actually be a good (because humble) place to act from, for non-equivalence itself goes against the grain of the homogenizing effect of modern techno-visual ontologies. The challenge, in many such ethnographies, has become how to inhabit the space in-between, their *interval*, collaboratively and politically, hopefully contributing to a decolonization from the imposition of the "one world" over others. (2).

There is hardly any cosmology, Western or otherwise, which does not structure the social by separating or connecting, socializing or naturalizing, distinct classes of beings and persons. (3) Images, whether ideational or material, play a critical role in stabilizing such divisions. As contemporary anthropology faces up to its cosmopolitical role in this mess of a shared planet, it might help to understand the naturecultures of image-making techniques as they are employed in different worlds; what happens when such other techno-visual ontologies look back at modern images (their decolonizing effect); and, if we're lucky, how different image ontologies might henceforth talk to each other. This means striving for the possible forms taken by the anthropological image, as that which may be capable not only of crossing cosmological frontiers but, moreover, of inhabiting those frontiers.

Image-Doubles

In several of his speeches, transcribed by anthropologist Bruce Albert, Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa says, "[t]he *spirits* are so numerous because they are *images of the animals of the forest*. All those in the forest have an *utupë* image: those who walk on the ground, those who walk in the trees, those who have wings, those who live in the water." Moreover, Kopenawa places these image-spirits at the center of the life of animals: "these images are the true center, the true core of the forest beings." (4) There is thus a spirit for every type of animal in their environment, but more importantly these spirits are images of the animals themselves: a mimetic relation between images and spirits, but also between such image-spirits and the nature of animal bodies. In his words, "[the animals] are merely imitating their images." (5)

Anthropologists of the Amazon region have described *image* and *spirit* in mutually ambiguous terms, as Michael Taussig does in *Mimesis and Alterity*, a book drawing on the mimetic quality of Cuna cultures indigenous to Colombia and Panama. This ambiguity becomes especially evident in a section where Taussig compares two different translations of the same Cuna healing story in order to show how a change of words can produce readings significantly, yet only apparently different. The first translation was created in the late 1920s by a Cuna who, under his new name Charles Slater, became a sailor on British ships. It reads:

> Anywhere we want to go for *image* we can go. If I want to go far up in the blue sea I can go there for *image* and I can go under there too.

The second translation, written in the 1930s by Baron Erland Nordenskiold in collaboration with the Cuna Indian, Rubén Pérez Kantule, follows:

> Wherever we want to go with the *spirits'* help we can go. If I want to go far out on the blue ocean I can do it with the help of *spirits* and I can also go down in the sea. (6)

For Taussig, Nordenskiold's is no mere clarification. On the one hand, it is a suggestion that image-spirits are a means of crossing normally unbridgeable frontiers (going out and down into the sea); on the other, it is a suggestion that from "the (mere) image of a thing comes its soul and spirit," with agency being therefore distributed across different forms. (7)

Here we have, firstly, the mimetic faculty or role of images. Summarizing it as "the nature that culture uses to create second nature," *mimesis*, for Taussig, means a type of bodily knowledge arising from confrontational alterity, that is, as a means of "contact" between seemingly distant beings, spaces and attributes: capturing the predatory affect of given animals in hunting and shamanism, or invoking the medicinal attributes of given substances and spaces, as when Taussig finds pictures from medical journals glued on the mud wall of a small "alternative" hospital in Western Colombia. (8) Central to Taussig's observations is his estimation that mimesis is actualized most strongly in liminal moments, that is, when borders are inhabited (and the skin, fur, clothes, feathers, and tattoos for that matter, are borders) and otherness and the adaptation to what lies beyond oneself dissolves, constituting, through that process, selfhood. (9)

Secondly, however, we find the notion that Amerindian notions of human interiority can be, to use the words of anthropologist Alfred Gell, "conceived as an interior person, a homunculus, within the body," and not as the kind of immaterial substance which Christianity defines as the soul. (10) In other words, there is a body, or the image-spirit of a body, within a body.

From this perspective, talking about animism in terms which suggest everything—animals, plants, mountains, rivers, the moon and the stones—having a soul seems insufficient, when across Amerindian socio-cosmologies one finds the idea that interiority or souls are "*spiritual doubles* of their material forms," that is, of their outer bodies—perhaps even, following Kopenawa, their environmental relations: the animal in its place. (11). In *Mimesis and Alterity*, Taussig refers specifically to the Cuna word *purpa* and *purpakuna* [pl.], which has been translated in a range of ways as souls, "mimetic doubles," "invisible replicas," and "invisible counterparts" of one's body. The inner image of an animal or plant is a mirror, or image-double, of its outer skin or material form: its appearance before others. Thus, "the *purpa* of a man with one leg, for example, also has only one leg." (12) Exteriority and interiority are mimetic-doubles

of one another, representing themselves mutually: mimesis.

This implies that the difference between animist and naturalist ontologies, to use anthropologist Philippe Descola's terms, should not be simplified to different degrees of distribution of subjecthood—that moderns, too, for example, start acknowledging the autonomous agency of others. But nor should these mimetic relations propose simply an inversion of the modern dualism between body and mind (as in cognitive embodiment theories, a pretension also addressed by Descola). (13) Rather than restricting any definition of animism to a plurality of souls, this perplexity of bodies inhabiting bodies, added to the suspicion of clothes hiding an inner humanity, has led anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro to suggest the notion of "somatism" as a better alternative to "animism." (14)

Image-Spirits

With Taussig in mind, I want to return to Kopenawa's words. Talking about image-spirits, he continues:

> These (…) are the *images of the animal ancestors* we call *yarori.* A very long time ago, when the forest was still young [and] our ancestors—*who were humans with animal names*—metamorphosed into game. The human peccaries became peccaries. The human deer became deer. The human agoutis became agoutis. These *yarori* first people's skins became those of the peccaries, the deer, the agoutis that live in the forest. So it is ancestors turned other that we hunt and eat today. (15)

Here, Kopenawa is focusing on myths and cosmogonist stories common across Amerindian South America: the first times, long ago yet in ever-present actualization, when all living forms, whether animal or plant, were human. Accordingly, image-spirits refer not only to the image-double of a given animal but also to humanity in general: a common humanity, visible at the beginning of time and now invisible, because dispersed into the forms taken by the many species-beings of the forest—beings who, each from their perspective, still see themselves as

humans but who cannot see us or any other animals or plants as such. (16)

In his essay "The Crystal Forest," talking about the Yanomami cosmogonies Viveiros de Castro writes, "mythic discourse can be defined as, first and foremost, a record of the process of actualization of the present state of things out of a virtual pre-cosmological condition endowed with perfect transparency—a 'chaosmos'." (17) As such, image-doubles (the mimetic body within the body) can be better understood as the fixed projection of such chaosmosis. They are an outer, actual form, indexed and specified (as if a picture frozen in time), of a metamorphic inner image, which is in turn a manifestation of that mythic virtual humanity that included every variation of species and from which all species came. Curiously, Kopenawa says that *utupë*, the image-spirit, "are like photographs." This is also true for the Cuna word *purpa*, which may also refer to origin myths, semen, menstrual blood, and speech, that is, to reproduction, replication, or mimicry in general (18).

Following Kopenawa, Viveiros de Castro offers an impressive definition of spirits in Amazonia:

> A spirit in Amazonia is *less a thing than an image, less a term than a relation, less an object than an event*, less a transcendent representative figure than a sign of the immanent universal background—the background that comes to the surface (…) when the human and the nonhuman, the visible and the invisible *trade places*. An Amazonian spirit, in sum, is *less a spirit in opposition to an immaterial body than a dynamic and intensive corporality*. (19)

Viveiros de Castro implies that spirits result from instantiations. Seeing a spirit is not so much seeing a thing, but catching a glimpse, as if peeking under the animal's skin, of the continuous, metamorphic "virtual multiplicity" addressed by myths, whereby spirits, animals, plants, and so on, "are only so many different intensive vibrations or modulations" of which "the human mode can be imagined as the fundamental frequency of this animic field." (20). If, as the above myths tell, the commonality of culture—humanity—beyond the modern concept of human species is a quality of Amerindian animism, the nature of cosmopolitical relations and representations within this "animic field" is thus said to be negotiated by the embodiment of the *many natures* of such

humanity.

Viveiros de Castro is the author who has most consistently consolidated the idea of multinaturalism—the anthropological concept, created in the encounter between animist and naturalist ideas about nature, which states: one culture (humanity), many natures (images, bodies, affects), instead of the modern creed in many cultures and one nature. Within this multinaturalism, the nature of images depends on the body, and yet the body too is but an image. The body is "the origin of perspectives"—and the problem is that perspectives are not stable, they are constantly being exchanged, the ontological borders of such natures being crossed. (21)

For when does one see such image-spirits? Under normal circumstances one does not see the animals as they are to themselves, playing flutes which to us are only coconuts lost in the forest, waging war with enemies which to us is simply them hunting prey. (22) Spirits make themselves visible only through unnatural encounters (when perspectives "trade places"), and are thus relational and virtual through and through—much like the status of the animal and the human within perspectival animist societies. (23) These "unnatural encounters" can be induced intentionally through relational practices such as shamanism, dreaming, hunting, and gardening, or occur by accident in the forest. The instability of the mimetism between images and bodies is laid bare in such spirited instances, moments when images are exchanged and otherness temporarily interpreted and inhabited. What seems to be at stake, then, is the appearance of bodies before others and the possibility of exchange of perspectives, that is, of seeing and catching—or being caught in—image-spirits; seeing the human in what should be nothing but an animal or a plant; seeing the equivalence of humanity across the ontological divide separating species and worlds, habitats, environments.

Taking from Kopenawa's words, one could therefore suggest that if images are central to mimesis, it is as shapes that shape ways of seeing. It is not simply, as in Plato's classical mimesis, as a projection of an idea, or in modern terms as a representation of the body of which the image is a copy or an expression. Rather, images exist as that which mediates between a here and a there—the image-skin: a liminal space, keeping ontological worlds at bay as much as connecting them.

Image-Traps

How does the above multinaturalist approach to images and spirits reflect back on the mediation performed by technovisuals in cosmopolitical encounters between worlds? As stated, technologies embody particular worldviews, and in their embodiment they end up privileging certain worldviews above others.

But often technologies also serve as "traps," with the ability of connecting distinct (and otherwise distant) bodies, as Alfred Gell once suggested in his essay, "Vogel's Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks as Traps." For Gell, the animal hunting trap is a prime example of an object that blurs the distinction between artworks and artifacts, because in order to act successfully on its prey the trap must interpret different life-worlds, that of hunter and prey. In doing so, it both relies upon and expresses the "complex intuitions of being, otherness, relatedness" that place art at the core of that social engine we call culture. (24)

According to Gell, the animal trap "communicates a deadly absence" of both hunter and prey. (25) Even without the actual presence of each, this double absence also contains their virtual, semiotic embodiment. On the side of the hunter, a good trap embodies a hunter's skill as well as his knowledge and attunement to the surrounding life-worlds. As for the prey, traps are always "lethal *parodies* of the animal's *Umwelt*" (26), be these shaped on the animal's literal shape—Gell gives the example of a giraffe trap in the shape of a giraffe—or acting, "more subtly and abstractly," as a stimulus for their behavior—"you need a clever trap for a clever animal," such as monkeys. (27) A dynamic and ghostly image of hunter and prey, traps allow for the deduction of each other's dispositions without ever fully having access to each other's world. This relation is only intensified in the event of a trap's activation, for it then acts as a trigger setting in motion the mimetic encounter of two worlds. Even before capturing the animal the trap has already captured its nature and image.

But what if one's body itself is the trap? In his study of the forests of the Ecuadorian Amazon among the Runa people, anthropologist Eduardo Kohn refers to the co-evolution between the giant ant-eater's tongue and the tunnels inside the mounds of termites. (28) For example, Kohn narrates how Runa men "took delight in explaining (…) how the giant ant-eater adopts the *perspective* of ants in order to fool them; when the ant-eater sticks its tongue into ant nests, the ants see it as a branch and, unsuspecting, climb on." (29) Such a doubling appears similar to Deleuze and Guattari's famous example of the orchid and the wasp. (30) Nonetheless, while the latter is framed (against mimesis) in terms of the philosophical concept of becoming, Kohn's example is intrinsically semiotic, and may open up other entry points into the naturecultures of images in Amerindian animism and beyond.

In what is called mimicry in biology, distinct organisms share similar morphological qualities. Following the non-Western explications of Kohn and the Runa, such similarities are the outcome of a mutual interpretation of signs and the recognition of shared, though irreducible, worlds. But it is not that one becomes the image of another—the reciprocal shaping of form between the ant-eater's tongue and the termite mound's tunnels—nor is it any attempt at inhabiting another's affective world. There is no stepping outside oneself, it seems to me, in Kohn's example; no illusion of transcendence or transparency. One does not become the other, one becomes something else, something in-between—a form of learning from the *interval*. (31)

To summarize, it is not that traps are representations of two beings-in-the-world operating inside one image-machine, but that traps are like portals into worlds: they are frontier technologies. It is thus that Gell writes, "[t]he trap embodies a scenario, which is the dramatic nexus that binds (…) protagonists together, and which *aligns them in time and space*." (32) Isn't this alignment what we are looking for? The ant-eater's embodied trap is about the possibilities one invents so as to be caught in another's image. It is about capture and interpretation, to thread the line of encounter. It is about sharing practices.

The Anthropological Image?

Looking beyond life in the Amazon, it is not without reason that humans send robots out to space to capture images of places that humans cannot reach. Or that when in Fukushima, there where cameras fail to capture radioactivity, the Geiger counter acts as a trap. Better yet, let us be symmetrical: in Fukushima, the Geiger counter *is* a camera.

It may very well be impossible to produce material transpositions of the Amerindian notion of image, from bodies and chants to film, paper, computer screens, and digital data. The linear perspective embedded in the camera's infrastructure, for example, implies that any such attempt will always and inevitably pass through a modernist, naturalist filter: an objectifying gaze that captures the environment at a distance, from which a division between self and other is established. This is not a bad thing; again, it is simply the confirmation of ontological embodiments in technological devices. The ontological difficulty in achieving total cultural transparency by scientific and technological means should not be a concern, nor does it undermine any anthropological attempt at cosmopolitics. For while the camera may hardly be the appropriate tool for translating non-naturalist cosmovisions, their use by indigenous peoples has contributed, indubitably, to strategies of political empowerment as well as disruptive filmmaking practices. This is beautiful, practical, embodied metaphor for multinaturalist encounters and discrepancies.

And yet, the above divide itself may be misleading, for it seems that images produced in "overdeveloped" modernity no longer obey the single objectifying gaze of a naturalist ontology defined by the nature/culture divide. As Donna Haraway wrote, already almost thirty years ago:

> The visualizing technologies are without apparent limit; the eye of any ordinary primate like us can be endlessly enhanced by sonography systems, magnetic resonance imaging, artificial intelligence-linked graphic manipulation systems, scanning electron microscopes, computer-aided tomography scanners, color enhancement techniques, satellite surveillance systems, home and office VDT's, cameras for every purpose from filming the mucous membrane lining the gut

> cavity of a marine worm living in the vent gases on a fault between continental plates to mapping a planetary hemisphere elsewhere in the solar system. Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile vision (…) this eye fucks the world to make *techno-monsters*. (33)

While the cyborg enhancement of one's body through a variety of visual systems has become normal, the total detachment or autonomy of nonhuman visuality, that is, visuality created and perceived independently of human knowledge systems, has also become a reality. In overdeveloped modernity, the positivist necessity "to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power" (34) no longer even seems in need of a subject, eyes, or a living body. There exist today more computer-generated images to be read by algorithms than images read by humans; and while such autonomy may appear harmless in the management of finance algorithms or image-recognition codes, it also is key to matters of life and death by drone. Techno-monsters indeed, breaking from modernity into an emergent ontology: an entirely new inhuman image regime. (35)

My issue, then, is not only the consequences of an encounter between animist imagery and Western image ontologies. Rather I am concerned about the possible shapes taken by the anthropological image when it is understood as a practice that, to paraphrase Haraway, can rupture the hegemonic gaze which sees objectivity everywhere. To think images as the embodiment of worlds means not only thinking the ontology of images but also thinking images ontologically, that is, not as representations but as *representatives*: "These are images which must see us in order for us to be able to see them[;] (…) images through which we see other images." (36) A fine definition of the anthropological image if there is one.

Whether all of this may be of interest will be checked by the emancipation lived both on the side of non-naturalist cosmologies, such as found in Amerindian animisms, and on that of modern technosciences. That capitalism cannot be excluded from the spread and ideological application of such technosciences is a reminder of how cosmovisional differences are more often than not incommensurable, and how incommensurability is incorporated into different image

technologies, be it cameras or tattoos. Barriers and frontiers should not be a problem, though. Clearly, the horizon of total liquidity and transparency is a capitalist dream—and there is more than enough proof that genocide is the only result capitalism is able of producing in the encounter with every barrier, with every frontier.

Notes

(1) My use of "naturecultures," rather than simply referring to "the nature" of images, follows from Donna Haraway's *Companion Species Manifesto* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007). Haraway coined the term in order to break the modern opposition between nature and culture, not to say one and the other do not exist, but instead so as to emphasize the symbiosis between images of nature and culture in the ordering of given socio-cosmological boundaries.

(2) For the clash between the "one world" and other, suppressed, worlds, and the necessity of taking a multi-world approach seriously (i.e. with implications for society and law) see, among others, Marisol de la Cadena, "Uncommoning Nature," e-flux Journal, 65, the *Supercommunity* issue, 2015; and John Law, "What's Wrong with a One-World World," *heterogeneities.net*, 25 September 2011.

(3) See Jacques Rancière's notion of the "distribution of the sensible," in *The Politics of Aesthetics*. London: Continuum, 2006.

(4) I quote this passage from a short text, transcribed by Bruce Albert and translated from the Portuguese into English by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro: Davi Kopenawa "Xapiripë," in Bruce Albert and Davi Kopenawa, *Yanomami, o Espírito da Floresta.* Rio de Janeiro: Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil / Fondation Cartier, 2004. Quoted by Viveiros de Castro in "The Crystal Forest: Notes on the Ontology of Amazonian Spirits," *Inner Asia*, 9/2007: 13. Emphasis by the author. This version can all be found in Davi Kopenawa, "Sonhos das origens", transcribed by Bruce

Albert in September 1998. Henceforth I will be quoting from Kopenawa's biographical manifesto, *The Falling Sky: Words of a Yanomami Shaman.*

(5) Davi Kopenawa and Bruce Albert, *The Falling Sky: Words of a Yanomami Shaman.* Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2013, 61.

(6) Erland Nordenskiold and Ruben Pérez, ed. Henry Wassen, "An Historical and Ethnological Survey of the Cuna Indians," in *Comparative Ethnographical Studies 10.* Göteborg, 1938: 355. Quoted in Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*. New York/London: Routledge, 1993, 102. Emphasis by the author.

(7) Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity,* 103.

(8) Ibid., 247.

(9) Ibid., 252.

(10) Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory.* Oxford: Clarendon, 1998, 136. For matters of brevity and dexterity, I am purposely leaving aside any further notes on the thorny problem of anthropomorphism vs. anthropocentrism in Amerindian socio-cosmologies: that "human" actually refers to the anthropomorphic or humanoid.

(11) Norman Macpherson Chapin, "Curing Among the San Bias Kuna," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Tucson: University of Arizona, 1983, 75. Quoted in Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, 101.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Philippe Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013, 187-188.

(14) Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, keynote lecture for the symposium *Em Torno do Pensamento de Eduardo Viveiros de Castro* at SESC Ipiranga, São Paulo, October 2015.

(15) Kopenawa and Albert, *The Falling Sky*, 61. Emphasis by the author.

(16) See, Joanna Overing, "Puzzles of Alterity in an Amazonian Ontology: How is a God, Spirit or Animal Human Being From a Piaroa Point of View", AAA Meetings, November 1999, 9. References to such origin stories abound in the literature about the region, for example talking about this topic in his book *The Jealous Potter* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) Claude Lévi-Strauss refers in particular Waiwai and Cashinawa myths. For a general introduction to the theme see, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Déborah Danowski, *Há mundo por vir? Ensaio sobre os medos e os fins* (São Paulo: Cultura e Barbárie, 2014).

(17) Viveiros de Castro, "The Crystal Forest," 17.

(18) For Kopenawa and photography, see Kopenawa and Albert, *The Falling Sky*, 60. For the many uses of the word *purpa*, see Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, 102. Furthermore, the Brazilian anthropologist Pedro Niemeyer Cesarino notes that *ütupe* is comparable to "*yochin* of Panoan, the *karon* of Jê and the *'ang* of Tupi speaking peoples," indicating a certain generalization of such uses.

(19) Viveiros de Castro, "The Crystal Forest," 20. Emphasis by the author.

(20) Viveiros de Castro adds, "a spirit is something that only has too little body insofar as it posses too many bodies, capable as it is of assuming different corporal forms. The interval between any two bodies rather than a non-body or no body." Ibid., 21.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Tânia Stolze Lima, "The Two and Its Multiple: Reflections on Perspectivism on a Tupi Cosmology" in *The Forest and The School/ Where to Sit at the Dinner Table?*, ed. Pedro Neves Marques (Berlin and Cologne: Archive Books and Akademie der Kunste der Welt, 2014).

(23) "If an Amazonian concepts of 'spirit' are not rigorously speaking taxonomic entitites, but names of relations, movements and events, then it is probably just as improbable that notions such as 'animal' and 'human' are elements of a static typology of genuses of being or categorigal macro-forms of an 'ethnobiological classification." Viveiros de Castro, "Crystal Forest," 21.

(24) Gell, "Vogel's Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks as Traps," in ibid., *The Art of Anthropology: Essays and Diagrams.* London: The Athlone Press, 1996, 203.

(25) Ibid., "Vogel's Net," 199.

(26) Ibid., "Vogel's Net," 202.

(27) Ibid., Introduction to *The Art of Anthropology: Essays and Diagrams*, 19.

(28) See Eduardo Kohn, *How Forests Think: Anthropology Beyond the Human.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013.

(29) Ibid., 96. Emphasis by the author.

(30) Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 10.

(31) The "interval" is a concept amply used by film-maker and anthropologist Trinh T. Minh-Ha. See Trinh T. Minh-Ha, section "She, of the Interval," *When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics*. New York and London: Routledge, 1991.

(32) Gell, "Vogel's Net," 202. Emphasis by the author.

(33) Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in ibid., *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature.* London/New York: Routledge, 1991, 188.

(34) Ibid.

(35) See Trevor Paglen, “Operational Images,” *e-flux Journal*, 59, 2014. Online at: http://www.e-flux.com/journal/59/61130/operational-images/.

(36) “Representatives,” not “representations,” is how Viveiros de Castro interprets the role of image-spirits and in reference to Albert’s translation notes on Kopenawa’s speech; see Viveiros de Castro, “The Crystal Forest,” 20. Kopenawa himself uses the Portuguese word “representante”; see Kopenawa and Albert, *The Falling Sky*, 60.